Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph

This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash equilibrium refinements and stochastic games as a tool to define a stable set of equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2014-06-11
Authors:	GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	game theory \| equilibrium refinements \| strategic stability \| stochastic games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2014015
Classification:	A23 - Graduate ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094061