Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes
Year of publication: |
2014-11-01
|
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Authors: | Garrett, Daniel ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Subject: | managerial compensation | power of incentives | pay for performance | dynamic mechanism design | adverse selection | moral hazard | persistent productivity shocks | risk aversion |
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